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Does the Sequencing Really Matter?: The Korean Experience
in the Capital Market Liberalization*
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The most serious sequencing problem in Korea was to liberalize
short-term financing through banks rather than long-term financing, and
to underestimate the potential devastating impact on the economy when
massive capital inflows have come to reverse. Although long-term
capital inflows were rather repressed during the pre-crisis period, it
would be an exaggeration to say that short-term capital movements were
liberalized greatly. Neither firms nor banks could sell their short-term
debt instruments in domestic currency to foreigners. Only liberalized
were trade-related financing of firms and short-term foreign currency
borrowings of banks.  However, financial supervision and appropriate
risk management was lacking. Without strengthening banking
supervision and enhancing corporate governance, corporate debt crisis
will be an inevitable outcome.  In this regard, the main lesson of the
Korean crisis is not the sequencing problem in the capital market
liberalization, but the structural deficiencies as prerequisites of capital
market liberalization.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
It is no wonder that the Asian crisis is considered to be "the worst
international economic crisis in fifty years," affecting two thirds of the world
population and putting nearly half of the global economy into recession.
Besides, as a senior IMF official publicly acknowledged, the Asian crisis has
been a painful learning process for everyone concerned.  In coping with the
Asian crisis, the IMF started to apply its orthodox prescription of high
interest rate policies and fiscal austerity measures along with rather drastic
structural reform programs.  Unfortunately, however, as the financially
stricken Asian economies did not improve as quickly as was originally
anticipated, and instead the crisis spread throughout the world, the IMF did
take a more flexible approach to the problem.
Disputes on how to resolve the crisis seem to be originated from divided
views on what caused the crisis in the first place.  For the sake of simplicity,
the academic circles may be split into two camps.  One camp, which focuses
on the liquidity shortage of the Asian countries, emphasizes the instability of
the international financial market and the skittish behavior of international
investors and creditors as a major triggering factor in the outbreak of the
crisis.1)  On this view, as applied to the East Asian economies, capital
inflows in the years before the crisis was driven, largely, by investors'
optimism about the prospects for earning high risk-adjusted returns in these
economies, rather than distorted market incentives or deep-seated structural
problems.  According to this view, the crisis took place when euphoria
turned to panic.  In this light, expanded financial support facilities through
the international financial institutions (IFIs), established orderly international
work-out procedures, and safeguards in the case of an emergency could be
relevant policy proposals for building the new international financial
architecture.  In addition, this view holds that the high interest rate policy
and/or other austerity programs should be reconsidered as those policy
measures may aggravate the situation rather than improve credibility in the
                                                
1) Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Chang and Velasco (1998) assert that the Asian crisis was
primarily caused by illiquidity brought to a head by a panicked, herd behavior of
international investors and creditors.
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eyes of international investors.
As opposed to this financial panic view, the other camp, including the IMF,
focused on structural weakness of the country in question, and, in particular,
the moral hazard problem in both the corporate and financial sector.  The
argument, as applied to the East Asian economies, is that governments
provided a range of inappropriate loan guarantees to their private sectors.
For example, banks lent to favored individuals, corporations or sectors of the
economy, on the understanding, implicit or explicit, that the government
would provide financial support to them in the event that their loans could not
be repaid.  A similar logic could explain foreign investors' willingness to
lend large amount of funds to domestic banks and favored corporations in the
aftermath of financial deregulation.  By this argument, these loans were not
advanced on the basis of commercial assessment about the likely soundness
of these domestic institutions, but because foreign investors assessed that
East Asian governments, or IMF-sponsored international rescue packages,
would likely repay the foreign loans if the domestic institutions could not do
so.  Accordingly, this view stressed the necessity for eliminating distorted
market incentives provided by public sector, implicitly or explicitly. 2)
In retrospect, we believe that both internal structural weakness and the
instability of international financial markets led to the Asian crisis.  Also
while identification of whether either of the two was the leading cause of the
recent crisis might help in some regards, a middle-ground approach that treats
each cause with equal weights will likely prove beneficial in drawing policy
lessons. Furthermore, two seemingly independent causes may be intertwined,
because structurally unsound economies are likely to be more vulnerable to
the instability of financial markets.
In particular, after the crisis, volatility or instability of international
financial flows appears begging more serious attention, if any.  Today, we
live in the age of rapid globalization and virtualization.  Thanks to the
digital revolution and the internet communication, the global financial
markets have become even more deeply integrated.  According to the Bank
for International Settlement (BIS), the daily foreign exchange trading volume
                                                
2) See e.g., Corsetti et al. (1998a, 1998b), Fischcer (1998), and Krugman (1998a, 1998b).
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in the world amounts to USD 1.5 trillion.  Less than 10 percent of the total is
directly related to bona fide real economic transactions.
One can easily imagine how volatile the global financial capital flows,
short-term flows in particular, could be if one believes in the existence of
"herd instinct".  And obviously, relatively weak and shallow emerging
markets would be the most vulnerable.  Volcker (1999) asserts that "small
and open economies are inherently vulnerable to the volatility of global
capital markets.  The visual image of a vast sea of liquid capital strikes me
as apt – the big and inevitable storms through which a great liner like the
U.S.A. can safely sail will surely capsize even the sturdiest South Pacific
canoes."
Since a global financial market and its potential volatility pose such a
grave potential danger for most emerging market economies, individual
countries and the international community should find ways and build
mechanisms, by which the systemic risk of global financial instability could
be minimized.  Most of all, at the national level, the old question on how
market opening should be sequenced may need re-examination in a new
perspective.  The old wisdom holds that properly and orderly sequenced
external liberalization should be from the current account to the capital
account and capital account liberalization should be in the order of long-term
to short-term.3)  However, after the recent crisis, heated debates are not on
how to get the sequencing right, but on how to deal with the volatility of
short-term capital flows.
In fact, there are often-heard voices advocating temporary controls over
capital inflows a la Chilean scheme, which should be introduced before a
crisis occurs, or controls over capital outflows, a la Malaysian way, which
should be applied after crisis arises especially if a country is in the transition
period of strengthening the institutional and regulatory domestic financial
institutions.  At the same time, the argument for an enhanced disclosure
requirement and changes in current bank lending procedures to hedge funds
                                                
3) The recent IMF study concludes that there was no unique path because economies start in
different positions. Speed of liberalization did not seem to be a determining factor in the
success of capital account liberalization. There were, however, some common elements of a
comprehensive program of financial sector reform that would contribute to orderly capital
Does the Sequencing Really Matter? 39
is also gaining force.
This development of policy interests suggests that the question on
sequencing should be dealt with in a rather broadened scope.  Indeed, the
main purpose of this paper is to argue that the scope should go beyond mere
contemplation on carriers of capital flows and comprise considerations on
incentives of domestic and international agents who make use of those
carriers.  In Korea, before the crisis, apparently short-term borrowings had
grown faster that foreign direct investment and other long-term borrowings.
Hence one may argue that Korea's liberalization policy bore the traditional
sequencing problem.  However, we will dispute this on the grounds that the
view is only touching the surface and discuss implications of the Korean
experience on liberalization policy.
2.  THEORETICAL DIVIDE:  PANIC OR MORAL HAZARD?
Industrial and emerging market economies alike share a common interest
in building a strong and safe system for managing global flows of capital.
To the extent that they take place in well-functioning, competitive markets
and respond to proper price signals, capital flows contribute to an efficient,
cross-country allocation of resources and risks.  A healthy capacity to
mobilize external capital is critical to financing a growing and successful
world.  In particular, capital account liberalization can provide developing
countries an access to foreign capital, increasing the amount of capital
available to an economy by narrowing the gap between domestic saving and
investment. This is significantly beneficial for capital-scarce developing
economies.
However, capital account liberalization also entails risks and potential
costs, particularly in the case of short-term flows.  Large capital flows,
whether inflows or outflows, can complicate macroeconomic management in
an economy.  Abrupt reversals of capital flows can also create serious
liquidity shortages, as shown by the recent turbulence in financial markets in
                                                                                                                   
market liberalization. See IMF (2000).
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East Asia and elsewhere.  In order to realize the full benefits of capital flows,
the risk exposure associated with capital flows should be properly managed.
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) blamed East Asian governments for undertaking
rapid financial and capital account deregulation without addressing the
concomitant need to beef up their supervisory capacity.  Rodrik (2000) also
asserts that in South Korea and Thailand, as in so many other developing
countries, financial liberalization and capital account opening led to financial
crisis precisely because of inadequate prudential regulation and supervision.
Kane (2000) also attributes policy mistakes to perverse belief that financial
deregulation would enable their insolvent banks to grow their way out of
trouble.  In this regard, one of the central lessons of the financial crises in
emerging market economies over the past few years is the importance of
prudential management of liquidity and related risks.
From the supplier (creditor and investor) side, on the other hand, the past
few years also have reminded us that international capital suppliers often tend
to underestimate risks as they reach for higher yields.  In other words,
international lenders should have as much responsibility for the crisis as do
emerging market borrowers, because for every questionable borrower, there is
a questionable lender.  In hindsight, the failure on the part of lenders and
supervisors in the major countries include poor risk management practices,
inadequate information as well as inadequate attention to available
information, and capital standards that provide unintended incentives to lend
to risky borrowers.  Such excessive risk taking, combined with high degrees
of leverage, can magnify the negative effects of any event or series of events.
Three years after the onset of the Asian crisis, it is perhaps trite to ask a
question why investors had held such optimistic expectations in earlier years,
and they suddenly lost confidence in 1997.  On the euphoria part, the World
Bank's 1993 report on East Asia, titled The East Asian Miracle: Economic
Growth and Public Policy, could be a good example to explain a flavor of the
widespread views about the region at that time.  That report argued that the
strong growth that had been experienced for so long was based on strong
fundamentals, at both the macro and microeconomic levels, and sound public
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policies.4)  On that basis, it was not so unreasonable for foreign investors to
expect a continuation of strong growth, and associated high investment
returns, in the region.
On this view, a long period of rapid growth and high returns led to
generate market euphoria about the region, which attract new investors and
more capital inflow.  Financial deregulation in these economies facilitated
the inflow, as did developments on the supply-side, such as the growth of
mutual funds and the decline in interest rates in the developed world.  There
were emerging signs of over-investment and the formation and growth of
asset bubbles in several markets in the region in the years leading up to 1997.
But while these developments may have been noted,5) they did little to deflate
the general feeling of optimism about the region.
Over the period 1995-97, however, there was a series of adverse external
shocks – particularly a trade-weighted appreciation of the region's currencies
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, to which they were de facto pegged, rose against the
Japanese yen, and a fall in the terms of trade for electronic-goods exporters.
These shocks brought into question the sustainability of the currency pegs to
the U.S. dollar, undermining the confidence of international investors in the
region's prospects, and leading to a sudden withdrawal of their funds.  As
the currency pegs collapsed, the large stock of unhedged foreign currency
denominated borrowings, undoubtedly fueled investors' new-found
pessimism and the sense of market panic, making the crisis much more
severe than it would otherwise have been.
On the contrary, an alternative explanation for the Asian financial crisis
has focused on inappropriate market incentives provided by the government
guarantees and rescue packages provided by international financial
institutions (IFIs) as well.  For instance, the term "moral hazard" has been
                                                
4) The East Asian Miracle, a World Bank study (1993), shows that the East Asian
interventionist policy regime was market friendly and as such was not as inefficient as it is
often made out to be. The interventionist policies were also in response to coordination
problems in the market. Furthermore, East Asian policymakers relied on contests that
combined competition with the benefits of cooperation both among firms and between
government and the private sectors.
5) Krugman (1994) pointed out that East Asia was running into diminishing returns and that
rapid growth was only being sustained by massive infusion of capital, much of which came
from abroad in the form of short-term credits.
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used quite extensively to explain excessive risk-taking behavior by borrowers
and creditors prior to the outbreak of the Asian financial crises.  In the
presence of insurance but unobservable efforts to prevent accidents, the
behavior of insured parties can be imprudent because they will not bear the
full cost of their action.  As moral hazard situations are pervasive in the
economy, a similar analogy has been applied to financial crises linking moral
hazard to imprudent behavior of borrowers and creditors by presuming the
presence of insurers such as government guarantees and even international
financial institutions.  The moral hazard argument was also used as a
convenient line to shift part of the blame away from badly-sequenced and
unregulated financial liberalization to insurers, either local governments,
international financial institutions, or both (Pereira da Silva and Yoshitomi,
2000).
The moral hazard argument stylized domestic over-lending syndrome as
follows.  Despite the absence of formal guarantees like deposit insurance
schemes, informal or implicit guarantees can play an identical role.  The
local political economy gives way to this informal insurance from risk that
came eventually to be associated with crony capitalism.  Over-investment in
such a context derives from the distorted incentives that the fraction of
guaranteed liabilities in the balance sheets of domestic financial
intermediaries lower their cost of funding new investment.
A similar analogy can also be advanced to explain the extensive unhedged
borrowing in foreign currency by East Asian corporations and financial
institutions.  According to this argument (Chinn and Kletzer, 1999), the
private sector in the East Asian economies was encouraged to borrow in this
manner by the exchange rate stability provided by the quasi-fixed currency
pegs to the U.S. dollar that operated in the region.  When the countries
suffered an adverse external shock, however, the implicit liabilities of the
government rose enormously as the possibility loomed large that many
private sector loans could not be repaid.  Furthermore, as it became more
likely that the currency pegs could not be sustained, the large stock of
unhedged foreign loans in the economy further raised financial fragility and
the implicit liabilities of the government.  By this argument, foreign
investors eventually became sufficiently concerned about the government's
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capacity or willingness to pay out on its rapidly rising contingent liabilities,
and hence they withdrew their funds, thereby precipitating the crisis.
International financial support is also considered as a source of moral
hazard arising from any public support.  A simplistic idea is that large
international rescue packages give the impression that international private
creditors having excessive risk exposures are bailed out with public money
during a crisis from a portion of the losses that they would have otherwise
incurred.  Hence, an extreme consequence of this view of the moral hazard
argument would be a proposal for dissolving or minimizing international
financial institutions functioning as quasi-lender of last resort.6)  In addition,
efforts at achieving greater private sector burden sharing are also motivated
by the perception that IMF assistance to crisis countries creates a source of
moral hazard if it allows private creditors to walk away without bearing any
cost of the crisis.  Furthermore, because the IMF is almost always paid back,
these payoffs are effectively transfers from the taxpayers in the crisis country
to international creditors (Eichengreen, 2000).
To the extent that implicit guarantees played a significant role in
generating economically wasteful excess capital inflow in the pre-crisis years,
as well as the sudden reversals of these flows, the appropriate policy response
is to limit these implicit guarantees as much as possible.  However, it is also
worth noting that governments in almost all countries provide substantial
guarantees to the financial system for the sake of preventing the implosion of
systemic risks.  Governments do not stand by passively in the event of a
crisis that threatens the integrity of the domestic financial system.  If a
systemic financial crisis were to arise in any country, the contingent liabilities
of the government would rise enormously, as they did in the East Asian crisis
countries.
Pereira da Silva and Yoshitomi (2000) concur with the moral hazard
argument and challenge the claim that moral hazard played a major role in the
international financial dimension of the Asian crisis.  They restrict their
                                                
6) Most prominently, the Republican-led majority of the Congressionally appointed
International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (known as the Meltzer
Commission) issued a report in March 2000, calling for drastically shrinking both the scope
of IMF intervention and the role of the World Bank in development finance.
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scope to explaining behavioral changes of the loans from Japanese banks to
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea and analyze the relevant financial
flows in and out of these countries.  In their story, competition between
financial institutions, between financial outsiders and insiders, compounded
by herd behavior by banks can explain most of the East Asian financial
bubbles, particularly when the effects of G-7 business and financial cycles are
added.  They conclude that it is possible to explain quite well without using
a moral hazard hypothesis the oversupply of loans by foreign banks.
Furthermore, the returned results of a qualitative questionnaire addressed to
Japanese Banks confirmed that the idea of government-backed implicit
guarantees offered to international creditors are not perceived by Japanese
banks to have played a significant role in their lending decisions to East Asia.
Conversely, fierce competition with other banks (particularly European) and
herd behavior did.
As previously mentioned, the extensive unhedged foreign borrowing
undertaken by East Asian corporations and financial institutions contributed
to the severity of the domestic recession that followed hard on the heels of the
currency collapses.  It has been widely argued that this unhedged borrowing
was encouraged by the exchange rate stability provided by the quasi-fixed
exchange rate regime operating in the region.  The obvious policy
implication, drawn by many economists, is that more exchange rate flexibility
would reduce the extent of unhedged foreign borrowing, thereby reducing the
financial fragility of these economies.  This argument may well be right.
In fact, most crisis countries, except for Malaysia, have adopted free floating
exchange rate regime in the course of currency turmoil.  As their currencies
were allowed to fluctuate on a day-to-day basis, banks and firms became
more cautious about the exchange risks.
However, the infrastructure of the foreign exchange market in most East
Asian countries is still underdeveloped.  As the free floating exchange rate
regime was introduced, the Korean government, for instance, also endeavored
to develop the infrastructure of the foreign exchange market through various
means.  In order to broaden and deepen thin and shallow foreign exchange
market, the government has lifted various regulations on the speculative
trading.  Volatility could be a necessary evil so as to induce more market
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participants interested in speculative trading.
While foreign branches play a role as market makers in Korea, domestic
banks as foreign exchange traders do not receive enough credit from those
foreign branches because the credit ratings of most domestic banks are still
below non-investment grade.  This limited access of domestic banks to
inter-bank forward or swap transactions has even aggravated foreign
exchange trading in the customer markets.  Since domestic banks have to
square the foreign exchange positions through, such as swaps, they have been
reluctant to provide forward contracts to domestic companies having hedging
demand.  Most companies should provide some form of guarantee such as
deposits or securities, thereby extremely limiting accessibility of small and
medium-sized exporters to the currency hedging markets.  In addition to the
creditworthiness of domestic banks and companies, most companies do not
have relevant in-house human resources to participate in currency trading.
Although they recognize the need for covering the exposures to the exchange
rate risk, market participation also incurs additional and sometimes
unbearable costs.
Economies with open capital account had better adopt a floating exchange
rate regime.  However, freely floating exchange rates have often been
excessively volatile, sometimes subject to prolonged misalignment and
overshooting.  These attributes are likely to be particularly disruptive for
developing economies, which tend to have poorly developed hedging markets
for the management of exchange rate risk.  In order to lower excessive
volatility, a combination of restrictions on foreigners' capacity to borrow
domestic currency, and active commitment to use monetary policy and
foreign exchange market intervention could be desirable as Singapore
provides one possible model
Finally, the moral hazard argument for dissolving or minimizing
international financial institutions is a very dangerous idea.  If the global
financial community really wants to reduce moral hazard on the private
creditors' side, measures to bail-in private creditors need to be in place to
manage a quick and orderly execution of debt relief and restructuring.
Eliminating the IMF would have severe consequences for the real economy
of countries experiencing crises rather than resolving the problems.  By not
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providing liquidity support, there is an increasing systemic risk of domestic
credit crunches, and ensuing severe recession, and social and political
meltdown.  Furthermore, solvent borrowers, faced with temporary liquidity
shortage, would eventually become insolvent in the absence of temporary
liquidity assistance by the IMF or other financial arrangements.  For the
sake of avoiding moral hazard, we do not need to pay unbearable price.
3.  CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN KOREA
3.1. Liberalization in 1980s
Throughout 1980s, the policy of the Korean government on capital flows
has been residual.  Under the managed exchange rate system, level of the
exchange rate and the corresponding current account balances were
determined autonomously.  Then, policies on capital flows were used to
accommodate current account balances.
In the first half of the 1980s, various liberalization measures were
undertaken to induce capital inflows for the purpose of financing current
account deficits.  In particular, the Korean government encouraged domestic
banks to borrow from abroad.  As a result, Korea saw significant net capital
inflows, most of which consisted of bank borrowings.  However, in the latter
half of the 1980s, the policy stance toward capital flows dramatically changed
as the current account balance began to record a large surplus.7)  In order to
maintain export competitiveness by mitigating the appreciation pressure of
the Korean won-dollar exchange rate, the government resorted to direct
capital control.  Commercial loans by domestic firms, with the exception of
public enterprises, were prohibited.  The overseas issuance of bonds and
depository receipts by residents was also strictly regulated.  In addition,
banks were encouraged to reduce their exposure to external debt.
However, gradual movement toward capital account liberalization was not
                                                
7) During the second half of the 1980s, Korea's trade surplus with the US exploded. It rose to
USD 8.6 billion by 1988 compared to only USD 763 million in 1982.
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absent.  After three consecutive years of current account surplus, Korea
formally accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2-4 of the IMF's
Articles of agreement.  This move required Korea to eliminate its remaining
restriction on payments and transfers for current account transactions.  With
limited but gradual capital account liberalization, the Korean government also
found it increasingly more difficult to manage the multiple currency basket
peg (MCBP) exchange rate system, which had been introduced in March
1980.8)  In the context of the standard Mundell-Fleming model, as financial
capital mobility increases, managing a pegged or targeted exchange rate
becomes increasingly inconsistent with an independent monetary policy,
since sterilization of capital inflows through sales of securities becomes more
costly (Chinn and Faloney, 1998).  Thus, in March 1990, the Korean
government adopted a variant of the managed floating rate system, which
allowed for a more market-based determination of the exchange rate.
3.2. Liberalization in 1990s
As pressures for liberalization were growing internally as well as
externally, the Korean government began taking a more active stance than
ever in 1980s.  A significant step toward capital market opening was taken
in January 1992, when foreigners were allowed to purchase Korean stocks up
to 3 percent of the outstanding shares of each company per individual, but no
more than 10 percent of a company in total.  Furthermore, the Korean
government, in June 1993, announced a blueprint for the liberalization and
opening of the financial sector, which aimed at substantial progress in the
                                                
8) The MCBP system is based upon the formula, which reflects changes in the special drawing
rights (SDR) basket and the independent basket as well as the "policy factor."  The
composition of the SDR basket, which was composed of a number of foreign currencies
(originally 16 but eventually watered down to the US dollar, Deutsche mark, Japanese yen,
British pound and the French franc), was determined by the IMF every 5 years. However, the
composition of the independent basket was never disclosed. It is generally believed that it
consisted of the currencies of Korea’s major trading partners, namely the US, Japan,
Germany and Canada. Even less is known about the last variable, the "policy factor."  This
factor ambitiously attempted to fill in the blanks and provide the inputs necessary to have
exchange rate reflect reality. Analysis of the exchange rate over the MCBP period (March
1980 – February 1990) suggests that the "policy factor" was the most influential part of the
formula. See Kwack and Kim (1990) and Kwack (1989).
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deregulation of the financial markets.  The plan envisaged further easing
requirements for foreign exchange transactions, widening the daily won-
dollar trading margins, expanding limits on foreign investment in the stock
market, and permitting long-term commercial loans.
Despite a series of deregulatory measures, the Korean government still
maintained a gradual approach and a considerable amount of capital control
remained.  For example, the opening of the bond markets was given special
attention, because there were large interest rate differentials.  And in general,
while most capital outflows were liberalized, capital inflows, in the form of
foreign portfolio investment in domestic securities and credits from abroad to
non-banks, remained subject to various ceilings and certain other restrictions.
This asymmetric position was justified by the concern that the potential
problem for the Korean economy was surge of capital inflows.  (Table 1
shows current account balances and capital account indicators since 1992.)
Table 1  Major International Transaction Indicators
(unit: USD billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Current Account Balance
Long-term Capital
Short-term Capital
Overall Balance
-4.2
7.2
1.1
4.9
0.4
8.9
2.0
6.5
-4.5
5.9
3.2
2.8
-8.9
7.8
5.6
3.0
-23.7
11.9
5.4
-5.7
Source: The Bank of Korea.
The cautious approach toward capital market opening continued when
Korea joined the OECD in 1996.  The Korean government maintained many
reservations to the code of liberalization of capital movements and current
invisible operations. According to the membership negotiations, the
government was reluctant to liberalize the capital account because of its
concern about a dramatic increase in foreign capital inflows due to the
interest rate differentials. The government had thus planned to delay
liberalizing the capital account until the interest rates would significantly
converge.
In sum, most of capital flows were subject to various restrictions.
However, it is notable that there were a few exceptions where liberalization
went on more rapidly.  The first was trade related short-term financing for
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domestic firms.  Restrictions on deferred import payments and the receipts
of advance payments for exports were lifted step by step without additional
quantity control.  The second was short-term foreign currency borrowings of
domestic banks, and the third was the issuance of Korean firm's securities in
the foreign capital market and offshore borrowings.  Finally, control over
overseas direct investment by domestic firms was also relaxed.
3.3. Capital Inflows in 1990s
Despite continued extensive capital controls, a large interest rate
differential between home and abroad, coupled with the bright prospects of
the economy, have made Korea one of the most attractive markets among the
emerging economies to foreign investors.  Furthermore, even the partial
nature of capital account liberalization undertaken during the pre-crisis period
(mid-1990s) triggered massive capital inflows.
For the stock market, the cumulative net inflow of portfolio investment
during 1992-1996 was USD 16.3 billion.  As of the end of 1996, the share of
foreign ownership in the Korean stock market has risen to 10.5 percent in the
market value.
Table 2  Trend of Foreign Portfolio Investments (Net Inflows)
(unit: USD million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Stocks 2034.5 5696.5 1960.3 2203.8 4373 777.4 3988.1
Bonds 0 0 30.3 17.2 15.9 197.5 227.6
Note: Only domestic stocks and bonds purchased by non-residents are reported.
Source: The Bank of Korea.
However, stock investment by foreigners explains only the limited portion
of capital inflows.  As seen Table 3, debt instruments accounted for the bulk
of total foreign portfolio investment, particularly since 1995.  Since the
domestic bond market was opened to foreign investors after the 1997 crisis,
foreign investors purchased foreign currency denominated debt securities
issued abroad by residents in Korea.  In this regard, capital outflows in the
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type of foreign portfolio were not a major triggering factor in the case of
Korean crisis.9)  Thus, "hot money and hedge funds" were not severely
blamed in Korea as much as in other Asian countries such as Malaysia, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan.10)  Furthermore, the foreign exchange controls were
reasonably stringent so that foreign speculators found it difficult to attack the
Korean currency.  Instead, the Korean government substantially accelerated
its ongoing capital account liberalization plan to attract more foreign capital
inflows after the crisis broke out.
As also found in Table 3, the major portion of the increase in foreign
capital inflows was the short-term external borrowing by the banking sector.
Consequently, the short-term external debt grew much faster than long-term
debt throughout the years, and the financial sector became the major holder
of external debts.  Out of the total increase in external debt during the three
years (1994-96), the banking sector explains about 70 percent.  The
remaining 30 percent reflect growth of the corporate sector's external debt,
mainly related with trade credits.
Table 3  Size and Structure of Capital Inflows
(unit: USD million)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Equities 6,615 3,614 4,219 5,594 3,102
Debt Securities 3,938 4,534 9,656 15,229 9,444
Foreign Credits to Corp. 1,969
(1,141)
3,058
(-108)
4,438
(-13)
6,242
(13)
1,165
(148)
Foreign Credits to Bank1 891
(825)
9,670
(1,633)
15,352
(5,088)
17,386
(8,080)
-6,205
(6,220)
Fund raised in
International Market2
3,011 1,671 2,260 2,632 5,008
Note: ( ) means long-term.
1. Net increase based on the standard of the World Bank.
2. Issuance of securities by private corporations.
Source: The Bank of Korea.
                                                
9) In case of Mexican crisis in December 1994, short-term securities investment, especially
Tesobonos, by mutual funds and institutional investors withdrew their investment quickly.
10) When Thailand crisis broke out in July 1997, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad launched a
bitter attack on "rogue speculators."
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Table 4  External Debt by Sector (Stock)
(unit: USD billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public Sector
Long-term
Short-term
5.6
5.6
0
3.8
3.8
0
3.6
3.6
0
3.0
3.0
0
2.4
2.4
0
22.3
22.3
0
Corporate Sector
Long-term
Short-term
13.7
6.5
7.2
15.6
7.8
7.8
20.0
9.0
11.0
26.1
10.5
15.6
35.6
13.6
22.0
46.2
25.3
20.9
Financial Sector
Long-term
Short-term
23.5
12.2
11.3
24.4
13.0
11.4
33.3
13.9
19.4
49.3
19.6
29.7
66.7
27.7
39.0
58.4
31.0
27.4
Total (A)
Long-term
Short-term
42.8
24.3
18.5
43.9
24.7
19.2
56.8
26.5
30.4
78.4
33.1
45.3
104.7
43.7
61.0
126.8
78.6
48.2
A/GNP (%) 14 13.3 15.1 17.3 21.8 28.6
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
In fact, short-term foreign currency liabilities of the Korean banks were
much larger than reflected in capital inflows.  As part of the liberalization
measures, banks were allowed to open and expand operations of overseas
branches.  By exploiting the foreign capital channeled through overseas
branches, banks actively operated foreign currency denominated business
through domestic branches.  This resulted in large foreign currency
liabilities of overseas branches comparable to those of domestic branches as
vividly shown in Table 5.
Table 5  Foreign Currency Liabilities of Korean Banks
(unit: USD billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Domestic Branches
Foreign Branches
15.7
20.1
16.3
23.1
22.6
31.7
36.3
41.3
50.7
52.9
387.9
312.5
Total 35.8 39.4 54.3 77.6 103.6 700.4
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Finally, another important feature of capital inflows in Korea is that Korea
does not attract a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to
the size of its economy.  Table 6 shows that Korea's low FDI stock to GDP
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ratio stands out among the other Asian countries that tend to exhibit a higher
ratio as well.  Capital inflows in the form of FDI typically represented only
a limited share of total capital inflow into Korea compared with portfolio
investment and other flows.  The comparison with other Asian countries
vividly highlights this fact.
Table 6  FDI Stock as a Percentage of GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 1997
China
Hong Kong, China
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
-
158.6
14.2
1.8
21.1
3.8
52.9
5.8
3.0
1.5
138.4
28.6
2.3
23.7
8.5
73.6
4.7
5.1
5.2
75.0
36.6
2.3
24.1
7.4
78.2
6.1
9.6
18.8
50.6
25.6
2.3
31.8
8.2
71.2
6.0
10.5
23.5
54.6
28.6
3.5
38.1
10.2
81.6
7.0
8.5
Source: World Investment Report 1999.
3.4. What Went Wrong?
Large capital inflows mostly through debt instruments with high domestic
savings helped fuel strong investment and growth.  These capital flows also
reflected favorable conditions in the global financial market, including low
interest rates and weaknesses in risk management in industrial countries.
Financial institutions played an important role in intermediating these inflows
or by providing guarantees on direct foreign borrowing by corporations.  At
that time, it was widely perceived that the capital inflows were attributable to
bright investment prospects associated with a stable macroeconomic
environment and high growth performance.11)
Traditionally, macroeconomic boom coupled with private capital inflows is
dangerous because it is prone to entail external imbalances and overvalued
                                                
11) Standard and Poor's upgraded Korea's sovereign credit rating in May 1997. This also
contributed to further inflows of foreign capital into Korea.
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exchange rates.  However, it is difficult to attribute the Korean crisis to
exchange rate misalignment.  After the mild depreciation in the early 1990s,
massive capital inflows during 1994-96 put appreciation pressures on the
Korean won.  To offset the pressures, the government relied on restrained
sterilization, and managed to curb the abrupt appreciation of the won and
resultant increase in the current account deficit.  During early 1994 to mid
1995, the exchange rates mildly appreciated.  However, the current account
balance sharply deteriorated from mid 1995, resulting in the depreciation of
the Korean won by offsetting the downward pressures of the capital account
surplus.  The Korean economy experienced large negative terms of trade
shock in the second quarter of 1996, which caused a significant depreciation
pressure on the Korean won.  As a result, the current account deficit in 1996
recorded the historical high – USD 23.7 billion.
Since all the regional currencies – except China's renminbi and the Hong
Kong dollar - lost value after the crisis, many economists and policy makers
argued that these regional currencies were overvalued on the eve of the crisis.
Although the lack of an operational definition of overvaluation is still
troubling,12) the price-based real effective exchange rates in Korea had been
around the equilibrium until 1994, but was being slightly overvalued on the
eve of the 1997 crisis according to our calculation in Table 7.13)
Table 7  Trend of Real Effective Exchange Rates
1990.1 1991.1 1992.1 1993.1 1994.1 1995.1 1996.1 1997.1 1997.4
111.39 104.62 100.26 100 97.86 92.02 90.51 93.66 96.06
1997.7 1997.10 1998.1 1998.4 1998.7 1998.10 1999.1 1999.4 1999.7
95.50 99.56 119.58 109.64 113.21 107.26 105.55 103.89 105.17
Note: the real effective exchange rates are calculated based on trade-weight, consumer prices index, and
January 1993 as the basis year.
Rather than volume imbalances combined with unsustainable current
account deficits, risks having led to the eruption of the Korean crisis were
                                                
12) On the definition of overvaluation, see Chinn (1998), Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996), and
Williamson (1994).
13) Radelet and Sachs (1998) reported that real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 12
percent in Korea between 1990 and early 1997. Chinn (1998), interestingly, reported that the
Korean won was undervalued even before its recent descrete drop in value.
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with liquidity imbalances.  What mattered was too much of short-term
capital inflows rather than capital inflows in general.  And more correctly,
rapidly rising short-term foreign currency liabilities taken by the Korean
banking sector provided the source of the problem.
That is, as in Lane et al. (1999), a key element of vulnerability associated
with capital inflows was the prevalence of unhedged short-term foreign
currency borrowing.  This was to some and important extent a prudential
matter, as it was reflected in currency and maturity mismatches in the
portfolios of banks and other financial institutions.  While foreign debt as a
percentage of GDP increased in Korea, short-term debt rose considerably
faster than total debt.  Growth in short-term foreign liabilities also outpaced
growth in available international reserves and created the potential for
liquidity problems.  In Korea, reserves had declined to about one third of
short-term debt by the end of 1996.
Table 8  External Debt and Foreign Reserves
(unit: USD billion, %)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Short-term Debt (A)
Total Debt (B)
Foreign Reserves (C)
(A)/(B) (%)
(A)/(C) (%)
18.5
42.8
17.1
43.22
108.19
19.2
43.9
20.2
43.74
95.05
30.4
56.8
25.6
53.52
118.75
45.3
78.4
32.7
57.78
138.53
61
104.7
33.2
58.26
183.73
48.2
126.8
20.4
38.01
236.27
Source: The Bank of Korea.
Also it partly explains why volume imbalances did not show up.  While
Korean banks rapidly expanded their foreign currency operations, the
magnitude of the expansion was not correctly captured in domestic monetary
indicators.  This was so because about half of the foreign currency
operations of the banking sector was handled by overseas branches whose
transactions were not reflected in domestic monetary indicators.  Had the
short-term external liabilities of overseas branches been taken into account,
the foreign reserves would have been said to be far less sufficient than was
the case in terms of buffer against possible liquidity runs by foreign creditors.
Moreover, the management of foreign currency liquidity risks at the
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individual bank level was not adequate enough to forestall the liquidity crisis
either.  Most financial institutions, particularly merchant banks and overseas
branches of commercial banks, were suffering from a serious maturity
mismatch problems as the crisis unfolded.
Table 9  Short-Term Foreign Currency Liabilities of
the Financial Sector
(unit: USD billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Short-term External Debt
Short-term Liabilities of
Overseas Branches
11.3
18.5
11.4
21.1
19.4
28.0
29.7
33.4
39.2
39.0
27.4
20.3
Total 29.8 32.5 47.4 63.1 78.2 47.7
Foreign Reserves 17.1 20.2 25.6 32.7 33.2 20.4
Source: The Bank of Korea.
3.5. Causes of Liquidity Imbalances or Maturity Mismatch
Why did short-term foreign currency liabilities grow to the extent of
risking a crisis? To put it in a different way, which aspects of the
liberalization policy might be taken responsible for it? The answer seems
concerned with not what the liberalization policy did, but what the policy did
not.
Although the amount of short-term foreign currency liabilities by the
Korean banks had jumped since 1994, their over-reliance on short-term
foreign debts was nothing new.  As Table 10 shows, the shares of short-term
foreign currency liabilities of the banks remained constant high at around 65-
70 percent since 1992, for which the earliest data is available.  It implies that
the Korean banks were accustomed to the associated risk taking well before
the surge of capital inflows and that underlying factors for the behavior of the
banks must have been in place all along.
Table 10  Ratios of Short-term Foreign Currency Liabilities of
the Korean Banks
(unit: %)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
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Domestic Branches
Foreign Branches
48.1
92.0
46.7
91.3
58.3
88.1
60.2
81.1
58.5
73.9
44.0
51.2
Total 68.3 68.4 72.8 69.7 65.3 46.5
Source: The Bank of Korea.
What could be the factors? One possible explanation is based on implicit
insurance provided by the government.  Dooley and Shin (1999) argue that
in the presence of the insurance, the Korean banks have chosen the more
risky liability structure to maximize the value of the insurance, while foreign
creditors also preferred demand deposit-type contracts that provided them
with the insurance.14)  Accordingly, they conclude that the Korean banks
enjoyed the insurance by over-taking apparently cheap short-term liabilities.
However, this hypothetical implicit insurance model does not provide
sufficient evidence on the Korean banks' risk-taking behaviors.
A huge part of maturity mismatch of external liabilities lies with
asymmetric regulation on short-term and long-term borrowings (Moon and
Rhee, 2000).  The government boosted incentives for short-term debts by
making it mandatory to notify regulatory authorities of long-term external
debts, whereas short-term debts were regarded as related trade financing and
therefore were not especially regulated under the Foreign Exchange
Management Law.  Thus, banks and firms had been operating on a long-
term basis with short-term foreign borrowings, leading to significant
discrepancy in the maturity structure.
Furthermore, maturity mismatch was more serious for merchant banks.15)
                                                
14) Prudential regulations sometimes provide an additional stimulus for foreign short-term
interbank lending. For example, the 1988 Basle Capital Accord requires only a 20 percent
risk weight for the computation of the capital adequacy ratio for short-term interbank
exposure to non-OECD countries, while exposures over one year have to be weighted at
100 percent. Moreover, the same rules discriminating in favor of interbank lending by
applying the concessionary 20 percent risk weight to interbank exposures, as opposed to
corporate loans or bonds. See Yeyati (1999).
15) Most merchant banks in Korea started as investment banks after the Decree of August 3,
1972, to provide legitimate channels to utilize black market funds. They were modeled after
the British merchant banks but were also permitted to engage in the financing of medium-
and long-term equipment investment. Later in 1994 and 1996, the 24 existing investment
banks were allowed to become merchant banks, joining the 6 existing ones. Several
merchant banks, owned by Chaebol, served as an important vehicle for raising the fund
required for Chaebol's voluminous investment, thereby lacking in adequate loan assessment
to their parent companies.
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For example, the liquidity ratio in foreign currency for merchant banks was
only 3-6 percent for all the periods up to the financial crisis.  30 merchant
banks heavily engaged in offshore operations, by borrowing cheap short-
term Japanese funds from Hong Kong to finance mostly long-term
investment projects.  With 80 percent short-term debts put into 70 percent
long-term assets, the maturity mismatch blew up when Korea's credibility
plummeted after the Dongbang-Peregrine fiasco.  Pressured to get the
foreign currency to repay their debts, merchant banks ultimately ended up
buying foreign currency on the spot market with won-denominated call loans
from commercial banks (Chung, 1999).  Furthermore, those merchant
banks were not properly supervised.  Neither unified accounting standards
nor standards for classifying non-performing loans existed, and supervision
had been perfunctory at best.  This lax supervision allowed merchant banks
to enjoy a freedom without any discipline.  When Korea went into the IMF
structural adjustment program, merchant banks were the first to go through
restructuring because their voluminous short-term external debts and
imprudent investments were inconsistent with the customary practices of the
world financial market.16)
Table 11  Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio
(unit: %)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Deposit banks 83.2 87.9 80.6 77.5 77.7 93.4
Development banks 30.8 32.8 33.3 39.8 43.4 61.9
Merchant banks  3.6  4.0  3.0  3.1  6.3 14.7
Note: The liquidity ration is the short-term use of foreign currency/short -term borrowing of foreign
currency.
Source: Bank of Korea.
4. POST-CRISIS LIBERALIZATION
The Asian crisis started on July 2, 1997 with Thailand's sudden decision to
float the baht.  On July 11, about a week later, the Philippines and Indonesia
respectively widened the trading bands of their currencies (peso and ruphia)
                                                
16) As the first step of the penal precedure, the Korean government had suspended the
operations of 14 most unhealthy merchant banks in December 1997.
Yunjong Wang58
from 8 percent to 12 percent.  On July 14, Malaysia abandoned the defense
of the ringgit.  Indonesia finally abolished its managed floating system on
August 14.  In the midst of this economic maelstrom, the Korean won also
quickly depreciated, following a futile currency defense that costed Korea
most of its foreign reserves.  This forced Korea to seek financial assistance
from the IMF on November 21, 1997. Korea widened its won trading band
from 2.25 percent to 10 percent on November 19, and finally abolished its
band and allowed the won to float on December 16.
With the free floating exchange rate system in place, the Korean
government also substantially accelerated its capital account liberalization.
Under the IMF program, the Korean government agreed to undertake bold
liberalization measures; in fact, the Korean government has taken much of
the initiative behind this.  Not only were all of the capital markets, including
the short-term money markets, was completely opened to foreigners.
Under the initial IMF program, set out in early December 1997, the
government raised the ceiling on overall foreign ownership of stocks to 50
percent in 1997 from the previous ceiling of 26 percent.  The individual
ceiling was also raised from 7 percent to 50 percent.  These ceilings were
lifted completely on May 25, 1998.  All regulations on foreign purchases of
debt securities were eliminated in December 1997.  As of December 1997,
all domestic enterprises, regardless of size, were allowed to borrow without
limit from overseas as long as the maturity does not exceed one year.  All
the short-term money market instruments, such as commercial paper and
trade bills, were also completely liberalized on May 25, 1998, and this has
brought Korea's capital markets on a par with the level of openness of the
advanced economies.
The liberalization of restrictions on capital movements was accompanied
by a relaxation of rules governing the use of foreign exchange.  The Korean
government established a simple and transparent framework to replace the
cumbersome laws and regulations that had governed such transactions.  The
new Foreign Exchange Transactions Law replaced the old Foreign Exchange
Management Law, and took effect in April 1999.  In particular, it replaced
the positive list system with a negative list, which allows all capital account
transactions except for those expressly forbidden by law.  While foreign
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exchange dealings in the past had to be based on bona fide real demand,
speculative forward transactions are now permitted.  This far-reaching
liberalization is important in bringing Korea closer into line with the market-
oriented principles adopted in more advanced foreign exchange markets.
The new system is to be implemented in two stages, April 1999 and the
end of 2000, in order to allow sufficient time to improve prudential,
regulatory and accounting standards before full liberalization.  The first
stage of the new system eliminated the one-year limit on commercial loans
while liberalizing various short-term capital transactions by corporations and
financial institutions.  Moreover, foreign exchange dealing was opened to all
financial institutions.17)
The government also implemented appropriate measures that could
counter excessive instability in the foreign exchange market caused by further
liberalization measures.  As of January 1999, the supervisory authority on
domestic financial institutions' soundness in foreign assets and liabilities was
transferred to the Financial Supervisory Commission, making it solely
responsible for the nation's financial supervisory function.  The required
foreign currency liquidity ratio of more than 70 percent for foreign exchange
banks has been applied to all overseas subsidiaries and offshore accounts of
domestic financial institutions since July 1998.
By establishing a comprehensive computer network system that can
oversee all foreign exchange transactions, including currencies, stocks, and
futures markets, the government is now undertaking a close monitoring.
With this monitoring system in place, the government also established an
international financial center to operate an "early warning system" to foresee
a possible currency crisis and to make appropriate counter measures.  To
limit the risk of a systemic crisis, the liberalization of short-term capital
transactions has been allowed only for "financially-sound enterprises." With
the abolition of bona fide principles in forward contracts, the government
decided to maintain a restriction on non-residents' borrowing in the Korean
won to a certain limit.  The new law also establishes a safeguard measure to
                                                
17) Financial institutions satisfying the government-set requirements, such as necessary
computer system, will be allowed to conduct foreign exchange dealing businesses.
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be used in case of an emergency.
In tandem with the first stage of foreign exchange liberalization, another
two important institutional changes are worthy of note.  First, the
commercial foreign exchange broker system was introduced, in January 1999,
by allowing private organizations to establish brokerage firms.  Also the
Fund Trading Center, the public foreign exchange broker which enjoyed the
monopoly position in interbank trading, became a commercial company.
Currently, two commercial foreign exchange brokers are competing in
interbank transactions.  However, as trading volume grows in the Seoul
Foreign Exchange Market, more brokers are expected to enter the brokerage
market.
Second, currency futures and options were introduced in the Pusan Futures
Market in April 1999 so that companies and financial institutions exposed to
foreign exchange risks could effectively use these hedging instruments.18)
Due to the fact that only large companies with good credit ratings could gain
access to forward foreign exchange contracts, most small and medium-sized
companies could not find relevant risk-hedging instruments in the foreign
exchange market before the currency futures were introduced.
As described above, the Korean government opted for additional big bang
in capital account liberalization.  This once again implies that the Korean
crisis could be prevented if appropriate prudential regulations were
effectively implemented and enforced.  The badly sequenced capital account
liberalization itself was not a major triggering factor for the Korean crisis.
The Korean government was very cautious in implementing capital market
opening, but it was not very cautious in supervising the banks.  Avoiding
future financial crises requires appropriate prudential regulation and
enhanced risk management practices.  Premature liberalization of capital
account without proper regulatory framework and effective enforcement of
                                                
18) Currency hedging products have usually emerged as countries have moved from managed
floating regimes to more fully floating ones. Currency futures, since they are traded on
organized exchanges, give benefits from concentrating order flows and providing a
transparent venue for price discovery, while over-the-counter forward contracts rely on
bilateral negotiations at often unpublished prices. However, despite the growing demand for
such products, currency futures contracts are still in the early stages of development. See
Jochum and Kodres (1998) for more elaboration on the introduction of futures on emerging
market currencies.
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improved regulations is likely to lead to "double mismatch" problem.
Accordingly, more impending policy challenges are today how to construct
more effective regulatory framework for bank supervision and encourage
financial institutions to adopt better risk management practices.  Unless
supervisory authorities are judged too weak to do a decent job of prudential
supervision over domestic financial institutions, the conventional wisdom of
capital controls will remain valid.
5.  LESSONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1. Strengthening Prudential Regulation and Supervision
In Korea, the problem of under-capitalization of banks was neither fully
acknowledged nor properly addressed. The BIS capital adequacy requirement
was introduced for all commercial banks in 1992.  Banks were required to
meet the minimum ratio of 7.25 percent by the end of 1993 and the full 8
percent standard by the end of 1995.  It appeared that banks had no
difficulty in satisfying the BIS ratios of 16 nationwide commercial banks on
average ranged around 9 percent.  Even at the end of 1997, immediately
after the crisis, that figure remained at 8.67 percent.  Moreover, those five
non-viable banks that were closed in June of 1998 by the Financial
Supervisory Commission (FSC) were reported to have the BIS ratios of 7.4
percent to 9.6 percent as of the end of 1997.
However, the reported BIS ratios did not accurately reflect the true state of
banks' financial soundness for various reasons.  More importantly, Korea's
standards with respect to risk management fell short of global standards.
Inadequate loan loss provisions, partial recognition of stock revaluation
losses, and loose loan classification standards and accounting rules led to a
discrepancy between official numbers and the actual state of the banks' health.
Establishing a system of prudential regulation and adequate supervision
must be taken as an essential prerequisite for capital market liberalization.
Indeed, in Korea, expansion of domestic banks' overseas operation lacked in
appropriate supervision.  No regulation existed on foreign currency liquidity
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risk management by mid of 1997 in contrast to domestic currency operation.
However, for every questionable borrower, there must be a questionable
counterpart.  As pointed out in Yeyati (1999), governments in lender
countries should also penalize high-risk investments abroad by incorporating
a realistic assessment of the associated credit risk.  Otherwise, government
in borrower countries may be forced to assume a more active stance to
prevent over-borrowing (or over-lending) and to avoid the adverse impact
that massive inflows of funds may have on the financial soundness of the
country.
5.2. Strengthening Corporate Governance
Overseas direct investment of Korean firms became active in the 1990s.
And in fact, strong overseas investment of Korean firms constituted the
growing assets in the balance sheets of overseas branches of banks.  In other
words, expanded liabilities of overseas branches of banks were tantamount to
rising overseas investment of Korean firms.  Notably, suspicion has been
raised that this investment behavior of firms may be an outgrowth from the
band wagon effect.  Large conglomerates pursued overseas direct
investment most vigorously in order to cope with rising domestic factor costs
in the one hand, and to achieve international prestige on the other hand.
However, due deliberation of the profitability of the overseas investment
projects were somewhat lacking.
After the crisis, it was recognized that the vulnerabilities in the financial
and corporate sectors in Korea were attributable, in part, to deficiencies that
undermined governance and market discipline.  In order to promote
corporate governance, the Korean government has improved corporate
disclosure requirements and accountability to shareholders, as well as the
transparency of economic and financial data.
5.3. Promoting Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, in general, do not enter any
financial market.  They are basically internal to each firm, and an inflow is
usually irrevocable, or only partly revocable if possible.  In this regard, FDI
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has been regarded as the most stable and dependable source of foreign capital
inflows.
Although the Korean government made efforts to liberalize FDI, its basic
stance towards FDI had remained passive until the crisis broke out.
However, the crisis became a momentum to change the government's long-
cherished passive position to active one.  As a result, the government
enacted the Foreign Investment Promotion Act.  This new legislation
focuses on creating an investor-oriented environment by streamlining FDI
procedures, expanding investment incentives and establishing an institutional
framework for investor relations, including one-stop services.  The Korean
government also undertook full-fledged liberalization in the area of hostile
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and foreign real estate ownership (Kim,
1999).
A modest net increase was recorded in 1997, despite a strong upward trend
in the first half of the year, due to the tapering off of FDI inflows noticeable
towards the end of 1997.  Picking up markedly during the spring and
summer of 1998, FDI inflows reached a record of USD 5.2 billion for 1998 as
a whole.  In 1999, this momentum continued, with net FDI inflows of USD
10.5 billion.
5.4. Orderly Liberalization: How to Sequence
the Capital Market Opening
As explained above, the most serious sequencing problem was to liberalize
short-term financing through banks rather than long-term financing, and to
underestimate the potential devastating impact on the economy when massive
capital inflows have come to reverse.  Although long-term capital inflows
were rather repressed during the pre-crisis period, it would be an
exaggeration to say that short-term capital movements were liberalized
greatly.  Neither firms nor banks could sell their short-term debt instruments
in domestic currency to foreigners. Only liberalized were trade-related
financing of firms and short-term foreign currency borrowings of banks.
The intention was clear: liberalize first capital flows that are only trade
related.  Then, how about short-term foreign currency borrowings of banks?
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Should the Korea government have restricted short-term borrowings of
banks? Probably not.  It is extremely costly to control short-term
transactions of banks.  What was lacking was financial supervision and
appropriate risk management of external debt.  Without strengthening
banking supervision and enhancing corporate governance, corporate debt
crisis will be an inevitable outcome.  In this regard, the main lesson of the
Korean crisis is not the sequencing problem in the capital market
liberalization, but the structural deficiencies as prerequisites of capital market
liberalization.
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